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TURNING THE LIGHTS ON
I.

INTRODUCTION

Public authorities1 have a controversial history in New York State.2 Responsible
for the creation and maintenance of the state’s most important infrastructure,
including bridges and housing, public authorities have often been criticized for a lack
of transparency, accountability, and improper governance. 3 In 2005, the New York
State Assembly passed the Public Authorities Accountability Act of 2005 (the
“Public Authority Accountability Act”).4 The legislation sought to remedy the
“shadow-like” activity of state authorities by creating an independent watchdog
agency, instituting mandatory reporting requirements and limiting expenditures.5
However, subsequent to its enactment, after several high-profile cases of public
authority misconduct, it became clear that the Public Authority Accountability Act
was not meeting its objectives. 6 According to the 2010 annual report by the
Authorities Budget office, “the law lacked basic enforcement language that could
ensure compliance, improve board member performance, and strengthen the
oversight role of the [Authorities Budget Office].” 7 In response to this criticism,
members of the New York State Legislature recommended that additional changes
be implemented to the statute.8 In 2009, Governor David Paterson signed the Public
Authorities Reform Act of 2009 (the “Reform Act”), which amended the Public
Authority Accountability Act.9

1.

“Public authorities are agencies that governors and legislatures establish outside the main structure of
government to escape the restrictions that elected leaders and the people place on ‘regular’ state
agencies.” Robert B. Ward, New York State Government: What it Does, How it Works 300
(2002); Black’s Law Dictionary 152 (9th ed. 2009) (defining public authorities).

2.

Ward, supra note 1, at 284.

3.

See Lynn Wilson & Clayton Eichelberger, New York State Public Authority Reform: Where We Have Come
From and Where We Need to Go, 11 N.Y. St. B. Ass’n Gov’t L. & Pol’y J., 1, 15 (2009) [hereinafter
Wilson Memo].

4.

2005 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1789 (codified as amended at N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 2–4002 (McKinney 2011));
Press Release, N.Y. State Authority Budget Office, Governor Signs Public Authorities Accountability Act
(Jan. 16, 2006) available at, http://www.abo.state.ny.us/archives/PressReleaseforChapter766%20_S5927.
pdf; Press Release, N.Y. Governor’s Office, David Paterson, Governor Paterson Signs Public Authorities
Reform into Law (Dec. 11 2008), available at http://www.weil.com/news/newsdetail.aspx?news=38465.

5.

See Wilson Memo, supra note 3, at 19–20.

6.

See Stephen Ceasar, A Magnifying Glass on Public Authorities, N.Y. Times City Room Blog (July 12,
2010, 12:37 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/putting-a-magnifiying-glass-topublic-authorities.

7.

N.Y. State Auths. Budget Office, Annual Report on Public Authorities in New York State (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 ABO Report], www.abo.state.ny.us/reports/annualreports/ABO2010AnnualReport.pdf.

8.

Sponsor’s Memorandum, 2009 Legis. Bill Hist. N.Y. A.B. 2209 (McKinney).

9.

2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1349–1384 (codified at N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 2–3957 (McKinney 2011));
Press Release, supra note 4.
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Notably, the amended law codified the fiduciary duties of authority board
members in the hope of achieving model governance.10 In the three years since the
law was enacted, no New York state court has had the opportunity to review the
fiduciary duty provisions of the Reform Act. Thus, it remains to be seen how these
duties can be judicially enforced.
This note will examine the fiduciary provisions of the Reform Act and evaluate,
specifically, whether the new obligation to act “in the best interest of the authority . . .
and the public interest”11 will play a meaningful role in influencing board member
decisionmaking and deterring misconduct. In assessing the effectiveness of the
fiduciary duty provisions, this note will examine when the duties will be implicated,
how they will be enforced, and, most importantly, the consequences of noncompliance.
After addressing these questions, this note argues that the fiduciary duty provisions
enacted under the Reform Act fall short of achieving the act’s purpose, which is to
eradicate the self-dealing and irresponsible decisionmaking that have too often
characterized New York public authorities.12 Thus, the New York legislature and the
courts must not only redress the harms that will be caused by misconduct on the part
of public authorities, but also further strengthen the enforcement provisions of the
Reform Act. This note contends that the imposition of significant fines on negligent
and self-dealing board members will strike a proper balance between redressability
and deterrence, thereby serving the underlying goals of the Reform Act.
Part II explores the historical role and importance of public authorities in New
York State, as well as the problems and abuses that led to the enactment of the Public
Authority Accountability Act and, later, the Reform Act. Part III examines the Reform
Act and illustrates, first, why the fiduciary provisions cannot be effectively enforced by
the public and, second, the limitations of the Reform Act’s current enforcement
mechanisms. Part IV proposes a limited role for citizen enforcement, without
compromising notions of sovereign immunity, through the imposition of fines.

10.

N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2824; see also Senior Partner Ira M. Millstein Applies Foundational Corporate
Governance Experience to Groundbreaking State Legislation, Weil Gotshal News (Mar. 9, 2006), http://
www.weil.com/news/newsdetail.aspx?news=25745.
The Model Corporate Governance Principles that Mr. Millstein eventually presented
to the governor had its foundations in the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but drew
significantly on the governance best practices he usually prescribes to his corporate
clients. Touching on subjects including the training of public authority board members,
the separation of oversight and executive functions, and the ethical conduct of all public
authority directors, officers and employees, Mr. Millstein helped to establish a set of
principles which ensure that public authorities in New York State are held to the
strictest standards of ethics and professional responsibility.
Id.

11.

Pub. Auth. § 2824 (McKinney 2011).

12.

N.Y. State Office of the State Comptroller, Public Authority Reform, Reining in New
York’s Secret Government (2004) [hereinafter Reining in New York’s Secret Government],
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb04/publicauthorityreform.pdf.
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II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN NEW YORK STATE

A. Introduction to Public Authorities
Public authorities are state-chartered public benefit corporations created “to
finance, build, manage, or improve capital assets and further public works.”13 They
supplement the legislature’s work by spearheading public projects through a
corporate-like model. Public authorities accomplish this by arranging financing for
projects and overseeing important government infrastructure.14 These entities, which
are usually overseen by a board of directors, typically issue bonds to fund important
public projects such as transportation infrastructure, housing, and hospitals.15 The
creation and need for public authorities evolved from the government’s obligation to
provide adequate public services.16 Because of constitutional restraints on debt
issuance that prohibit the State from borrowing excessively, the State found it more
convenient to use public authorities to fund these projects.17 The birth of independent
public authorities allowed for the issuance of debt to finance capital projects without
the State having to assume the liabilities.18
The first modern public authority in New York State was the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, created in 1921 to enhance regional port facilities.19
However, the real potential of public authorities emerged under master-builder
Robert Moses, who used, among others, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel
Authority to finance and build much of New York’s modern infrastructure.20 Over a
forty-four year period, Moses’s projects included the Triborough Bridge, Jones Beach
State Park, and the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge.21 While celebrated for influencing

13.

Ira M. Millstein et al., New York State Commission on Public Authority Reform Report
(2006) [hereinafter Commission on Public Authority Reform Report], http://www.abo.state.
ny.us/commissionPublicAuth/FinalReport.pdf.

14.

See Citizens Budget Comm’n, New York’s Public Authorities: Promoting Accountability
and Taming Debt (2006) [hereinafter CBC Public Authority Problems], http://www.cbcny.org/
sites/default/files/reportsummary_authorities_06012006.pdf.

15.

See Citizens Budget Comm’n, Public Authorities in New York State (2006) [hereinafter CBC
2006 Report], http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/report_authorities_04012006.pdf (highlighting
the historical problems of public authorities and suggesting reforms).

16.

Id.

17.

Id. at 2.

18.

Schultz v. State, 84 N.Y.2d 231, 244 (1994) (Noting that public authorities would “protect the State
from liability and enable public projects to be carried on free from restrictions otherwise applicable”
(quoting In re Plumbing, Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. State Thruway
Auth., 5 N.Y.2d 420 (1995)).

19.

CBC 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 1.

20. See Paul Goldberger, Obituary, Robert Moses, Master Builder, is Dead at 92, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1981, at A1.
21.

Id.
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the “planning of cities around the nation,” Moses’s power highlighted the potential
for abuses in authority governance. 22
In carrying out their mandates, New York public authorities differ from other
state agencies because they have traditionally been exempt from certain oversight and
accountability requirements. 23 For example, key decisions relating to expenditures
and large projects are often not subject to outside voter approval. 24 The public
authorities’ autonomy balances “political accountability and political independence”
by allowing an authority “to make difficult and unpopular decisions outside the
arena of elected politics.” 25 Consequently, over the years some New York public
authorities have abused this autonomy, as evidenced by excessive spending,
insufficient disclosure, and the accumulation of massive debt. 26 To understand the
magnitude of this, it was reported that public authority expenditures equal eightyfour percent of New York’s general fund spending.27
B. How Public Authorities Operate
As of August 2010, there were 323 state authorities and 771 local authorities in
New York.28 New York authorities vary in spending levels, mission, and governance.
Among the largest in size, as measured by annual spending, are the New York
22.

Id.; see generally Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York
(Vintage Books ed. 1975).

23.

For an overview of how public authorities work, see What Is a Public Authority?, N.Y. Office of the State
Comptroller, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pubauth/whatisauthority.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).

24.

See CBC 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 14–22. This note uses “outside voter approval” to refer to those
other than the public authority board members.

25.

See id. at iv.

26. See Casey Seiler, Shadow Government Debt Hits $52 Billion, Times Union (Albany), Aug. 11, 2010, at A3,

available at http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Shadow-government-debt-hits-52-billion-612662.
php; see also N.Y. Office of the State Comptroller, New York’s Public Authorities by the
Numbers (2010) [hereinafter New York’s Public Authorities by the Numbers], www.osc.state.ny.us/
pubauth/reports/pub-auth-num.pdf.
27.

Seiler, supra note 26; see also Ceasar supra note 6.

28. New York’s Public Authorities by the Numbers, supra note 26. “State” and “local” authorities are

statutorily defined under N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2 (McKinney 2011).
1. “state authority” shall mean a public authority or public benefit corporation created
by or existing under this chapter or any other law of the state of New York, with one
or more of its members appointed by the governor or who serve as members by
virtue of holding a civil office of the state, other than an interstate or international
authority or public benefit corporation, including subsidiaries of such public
authority or public benefit corporation.
2. “local authority” shall mean (a) a public authority or public benefit corporation
created by or existing under this chapter or any other law of the state of New York
whose members do not hold a civil office of the state, are not appointed by the
governor or are appointed by the governor specifically upon the recommendation of
the local government or governments; (b) a not-for-profit corporation affiliated
with, sponsored by, or created by a county, city, town or village government; (c) a
local industrial developmental agency or authority or other local public benefit
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Dormitory Authority, Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), and New York State
Thruway Authority. 295 )10,65 &)1,7-*(#(!5 /."),#.#-A1"#"5 #(/,5
-/-.(.#&&35 &--5 .A-/"5 -5 &)&5 */&#5 1),%-5 (5 )''/(#.35 0&)*'(.5
authorities, play an equally pivotal role in serving New Yorkers and are equally prone
to excessive spending and debt accumulation.30
The three principal ways public authorities borrow to accomplish their goals and
fund their projects are project revenue debt, private conduit debt, and state-supported
debt. 31 Revenue bonds are repaid with the funds or revenue generated by the
authority’s projects. For example, an authority may issue bonds to build a bridge;
thereafter, toll-collecting serves to repay the debt incurred by the project.32 In this
case, the public authority is “self-supporting, able to meet debt obligations through
revenues obtained from its own valuable assets, such as fares and user fees.”33
Public authorities also issue conduit debt “on behalf of a private individual or
firm in order to take advantage of federal tax exemptions.”34 In this situation, the
private entity, such as a university or hospital, not the government, becomes the
source for repaying the debt.35 The private entity takes on the responsibility of the
debt, rather than the public entity. Conduit debt is often used for financing housing,
healthcare, or educational infrastructure because these public institutions stand to
benefit most from the favorable tax treatment. 36
The third type of authority debt, state-supported debt, is the largest portion of
public authority debt and the most controversial because it implicates tax dollars. In
."#-5 .!),365 !(,&5 !)0,('(.5 ,0(/A().&35 .25 )&&,-A#-5 ((/&&35
appropriated to repay the interest and principal of this debt.37 The bonds issued are
corporation; (d) an affiliate of such local authority; or (e) a land bank corporation
created pursuant to article sixteen of the not-for-profit corporation law.
Id.
29. N.Y. State Auths. Budget Office, Annual Report on Public Authorities in New York State

(2011) [hereinafter 2011 A BO R eport], w w w.abo.state.ny.us/reports/annualreports/
ABO2011AnnualReport.pdf. The MTA is one of the hundreds of public authorities in New York State.
The MTA’s spending accounts for roughly twenty-two percent of the state’s authority debt. Id. at 17.
30. For example, the Trust for Cultural Resources of the County of Onondaga “is an authorized issuer of

bonds for non-profit cultural organizations” and “offers a local, convenient and more economical
financing opportunity for the Onondaga County’s non-profit establishments.” Onondaga County Trust
for Cultural Resources, Economic Development Services, Syracuse Central, http://www.syracusecentral.
com/Economic-Development-Services-Trust-for-Cultural-Resources.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
31.

CBC Public Authority Problems, supra note 14. For more information and specific figures on
public authority debt, see Data on Public Authority Debt, N.Y. State Comptroller, http://www.osc.
state.ny.us/pubauth/data/pa_debt_june2010.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).

32.

CBC Public Authority Problems, supra note 14, at 6.

33.

Schultz v. State, 84 N.Y.2d 231, 244 (1994).

34. CBC Public Authority Problems, supra note 14, at 6.
35.

Id. at 6.

36. Commission on Public Authority Reform Report, supra note 13, at 12.
37.

Wilson Memo, supra note 3.
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“backed by appropriations of state controlled revenues to secure projects set forth in
the State’s capital plan,” which can range from schools to highways. 38
State-supported public authority debt per household in New York reached $7,900
in 2009.39 This public authority debt is problematic not only because of the amount
outstanding, but also because it is issued largely through “backdoor” borrowing.40
Backdoor borrowing (or spending) refers to state-supported debt that is not subject
to voter approval.41 In 2009, the Office of the New York State Comptroller reported
that “more than 94 percent of all long-term State-funded debt outstanding was issued
by public authorities.”42 This means that in New York, voters had approved only
about six percent of state-supported debt.43
Critics contend that such borrowing by public authorities “limits accountability
and transparency by circumventing public participation and transferring control over
the spending of billions of taxpayer dollars to largely autonomous public authority
boards.”44 A second problem with backdoor debt is that it “has been applied to cover
the State’s operating expenses rather than for capital investments” without proper
government oversight and functions without voter approval.45
C. Events Leading to the Public Authority Accountability Act
A 2004 report by State Comptroller Alan Hevesi46 noted that “past practices by
[New York] authorities reveals a history of unethical and, at times, illegal activities.”47
These “practices” by appointed authority board members included bribery, nepotism,
funding and resource misuse, excessive pay, ethical misconduct, and negligent
decisionmaking. In the last twenty years, numerous scandals and illegal public
authority practices have been exposed, often including a recurrence of wrongdoings.48
38. Commission on Public Authority Reform Report, supra note 13, at 12. “After the State’s capital budget

is negotiated, specific capital projects are assigned by the legislature to designated Authorities.” Id. at 12 n.5.
39.

New York’s Public Authorities by the Numbers, supra note 26, at 2.

40. Wilson Memo, supra note 3, at 21.
41.

Assemblywoman Nancy Calhoun, Crushing Debt Fed by Unlawful Borrowing, N.Y. State Assembly
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://assembly.state.ny.us/mem/Nancy-Calhoun/story/41558/.

42.

New York’s Public Authorities by the Numbers, supra note 26, at 2.

43.

See id.

44. Wilson Memo, supra note 3, at 21.
45.

CBC 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 14.

46. Ironically, though “the State Comptroller is responsible for ensuring that the taxpayers’ money is being

used effectively and efficiently to promote the common good,” What are the Comptroller’s Responsibilities?,
Office of the State Comptroller, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/about/response.htm (last visited Feb.
18, 2012), in 2006 Alan Hevesi pled guilty to corruption charges stemming from a pension investment,
see Michael Cooper, Hevesi Pleads Guilty to a Felony and Resigns, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2006, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/23/nyregion/23hevesi.html.
47.

Reining in New York’s Secret Government, supra note 12, at 29.

48. Id. The Executive Director of the New York State Bridge Authority was investigated and audited in

1986 and 2003 for “inappropriate business expenses.” Id. Similarly, the New York Convention Center
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There have been noteworthy examples of past authority misconduct over the years.
For instance, a board appointed a former state assemblyman with no experience in
energy matters as chairman of the New York Power Authority.49 Also significant was
the New York Dormitory Authority’s loss of $21 million due to inappropriate and
ill-advised investments by unqualified employees.50 The New York State Thruway
Authority’s decision to sell to a private developer exclusive access rights to the Erie
Canal for only $30,000 when they were likely valued at a much higher amount was
another example of controversial decisionmaking.51
While the range of authority misconduct is diverse, authority board members
often play central roles.52 It eventually became clear to New York lawmakers that
misconduct by public authority board members, and the failure to discover it, could
be attributed to lax statutory oversight and accountability requirements. A report by
the Citizens Budget Commission highlighted five recurring problems with public
authority governance in New York State: “[i]nsufficient reporting and accountability,”
“[i]nsufficient independence in governance,” “[m]isuse of the power to incur
government-backed debt,” “[i]nsufficient oversight and coordination of project
revenue debt,” and “[i]neffective use of private conduit debt.”53 The Public Authority
Accountability Act sought to address these problems. In addition to the creation of
the independent Authorities Budget Office, which was charged with overseeing
authority operations, practices and reports to ensure compliance, the Public Authority
Accountability Act codified model board governance principles.54 These principles
and guidelines, derived from governance models used by the private sector, included
training on ethical duties and responsibilities, establishment of codes of conduct, and
strategies to minimize conflicts of interest.55
Operating Corporation, which operated the Javitz Center at the time, faced racketeering and extortion
charges throughout the 1990s. Id.
49. Id. at 33.
50. Id. at 30; see Susan Chira, College Project Put Off as Agency Faces Fiscal Woes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2006,

at A3.
51.

Michael Cooper, State Cancels Deal to Develop Erie Canal, N.Y. Times, May 11, 2004, at B1 (“After
defending the contract for months, officials at the Canal Corporation, a subsidiary of the New York
State Thruway Authority that [had] awarded the contract three years ago, decided to end it.”). Regarding
this transaction, which was later voided by Governor Pataki, one legislator commented, “This state is
selling used trucks for more than” that amount. Lydia Polgreen, Selling Off Access to the Erie Canal;
Developer’s $30,000 Purchase Raises Concerns About the Process, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2003, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/29/nyregion/selling-off-access-erie-canal-developer-s30000-purchase-raises-concerns-about.html?pagewanted=2.

52.

See generally Reining in New York’s Secret Government, supra note 12.

53.

CBC Public Authority Problems, supra note 14, at 2.

54. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29. See generally N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2824 (McKinney 2011). In

addition to the codification of fiduciary duties, the law provides that an authority board member must
understand “his or her duty of loyalty and care to the organization and commitment to the authority’s
mission and the public interest.” Id. § 2824(1)(g).
55.

Id.; Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8.
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D. The Public Authority Reform Act
Even after the Public Authority Accountability Act was passed, several legislators
found that public authority board members still “operated in secret, mismanaged
resources, and showered developers with sweetheart deals.”56 Therefore members of
the New York State Assembly believed it was necessary to amend the law in order to
address the abuses initially contemplated in the Public Authority Accountability Act.
In 2009, the New York State Assembly amended the Public Authority Accountability
Act by passing the Reform Act to both give the Authorities Budget Office (ABO)
more oversight power and strengthen the ethical obligations and disclosure
requirements of public authority directors.57
Under the Reform Act, all board members now have a fiduciary duty that is
arguably enforceable by the Authorities Budget Office Director.58 The law states in
pertinent part that board members must perform their duties
in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which an
ordinarily prudent person in like position would use under similar
circumstances, and may take into consideration the views and policies of any
elected official or body, or other person and ultimately apply independent
judgment in the best interest of the authority, its mission and the public.59

Additionally, the Sponsor’s Memorandum calls for board members to execute an
acknowledgement of these fiduciary duties, obligating board members to possess a
basic command of their duties, specific to each board, and competency to carry out
their functions.60
Corporate governance expert Ira Milstein developed the Reform Act’s fiduciary
duty provisions based on the private corporate governance model.61 Under Delaware
56. Press Release, N.Y. State Legislature, Senators Urge Governor to Sign Authorities Reform Bill (Aug. 21

2009), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/AuthorityReformPressRelease.pdf. After the
passage of the Public Authority Accountability Act it was found that, “[a]dditional reforms and fixes are
necessary to make the system more accountable and transparent.” Legislative Memo, 2009 N.Y. Sess.
Law News Ch. 505 (McKinney). The amended law also established whistleblower protections,
additional debt issuance limits, and rules for the disposition of authority property. See Press Release,
supra note 4.
57.

See Scott Fein, The Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009, 11 N.Y. St. B. Ass’n Gov’t L. & Pol’y J. 102,
103 (2009).

58. See Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8.
59.

Pub. Auth. § 2824(1)(g).

60. See Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8.
61.

See Governor’s Task Force on the Implementation of the 2009 Public Authorities Reform
Act 10 (2010) [hereinafter Task Force Report], http://www.abo.state.ny.us/aboTaskForce/
ParaTaskForceFinalReport.pdf.
Over the years, the Delaware courts have articulated and enforced fiduciary duties of
directors under state law on a case-by-case basis. This body of law has become the
backbone of best practices for boards of public corporations. In recent times, it has also
been recognized as applicable to not- for-profit corporations, irrespective of the fact that
not-for-profit corporations have no shareholders, on the grounds that they have
identifiable constituents that are highly dependent on them. If anything, the case is even
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law, company shareholders may judicially challenge a board member’s breach of
fiduciary duty.62 These duties require that board members act “on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.”63 If challenged, board members may then defend their conduct
pursuant to the business judgment rule. The business judgement rule “exists to
protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power.”64 Where
“the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or of
loyalty or acted in bad faith . . . the burden then shifts to the director defendants to
demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation
and its shareholders.”65 A failure of the directors to meet this burden results in
liability.66 Courts have found directors liable for a violation of their fiduciary duties
based on conduct that amounts to gross negligence or blatant disregard for shareholder
interests. 67 Loosely analogizing taxpaying state citizens to shareholders of a
corporation suggests that public authority directors could be found liable for taking
action against the public’s best interests if it was made without justification. From
this perspective, it was easy to see the appeal of utilizing the private sector model for
the Reform Act, as misconduct by directors of public sector boards could potentially
hurt tax-paying citizens.68
The drafters of the Reform Act codified these fiduciary duties to focus authority
boards “on their legal obligations, including understanding that these duties are the
means by which the board carries out the mission of the authority.”69 The legislature
believed that the establishment of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care were
essential to improve authority governance and deter negligence and self-dealing.70
-.,)(!,5 ),5 */&#5 /."),#.#-A."5 #(.# #&5 )(-.#./(.-5 #(5 ."#-5 #(-.(5 ,5 ."5
citizens of the State and the resources public authorities expend, are the State’s resources.
Id.
62. See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
63. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
64. Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
65.

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). Private shareholders may obtain
information about board member actions from the website of the Securities Exchange Commission.
Search, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/search/search.htm (last
modified July 19, 2011) (follow “Search” hyperlink; then search by “Company Filings,” “SEC
Documents,” or by a general “Search Engine”). New Yorkers do not have this right against public
authority board members.

66. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 53.
67.

See Smith, 488 A.2d 858 (holding company directors liable for gross negligence). Although this case has
been overturned via statute, it still stands for a proposition that board directors can be held liable for
breach of their fiduciary duty. Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).

68. See Adam P. Gordon, Suggested Best Practices for Municipal Issuers in Light of Recent Enforcement Trends,

24 J. Tax’n & Reg. Fin. Institutions 33 (2011).
69. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 1.
70. Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8. The drafters believed that “with ‘good’ governance and the

effectuation of fiduciary duties, it is far more likely that ‘bad’ performance will be avoided.” Task Force
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The government Task Force on the Implementation of the 2009 Public Authorities
Reform Act (the “Task Force”) led by Millstein made recommendations regarding
the Reform Act’s implementation and explained when the fiduciary duties are
implicated. The duty of loyalty is breached when a board member’s judgment “is, or
could be, influenced by a factor (fear, friendship, personal gain).” 71 Regarding the
duty of care, the Task Force noted that board members must make informed,
independent decisions that do not waste the authority’s assets.72 Millstein further
clarified the fiduciary duties as follows:
The business judgment rule . . . means: you don’t have to be right. You can
make a mistake. And you can even make a decision where [] the ABO says,
[w]e didn’t think that was a good idea or [y]ou shouldn’t have done that. That’s not
going to get you into trouble. What’s going to get you into trouble is when
you didn’t pay attention, you didn’t have a process, you didn’t think about it,
and you didn’t make up your mind independently about what to do.73

While the fiduciary provisions of the Reform Act are clearly defined, because
they were recently enacted, the statute’s enforcement mechanisms have yet to be
tested. Consequently, it is essential to identify and remedy any apparent weaknesses
in these provisions. Adequate oversight and compliance are critical to meaningful
public authority reform. Yet it remains to be seen whether the statute will be able to
meet its objectives.
III. A WEAK ENFORCEMENT REGIME

A hypothetical example of a breach of fiduciary duty by a director of a New York
public authority illustrates the limited public remedies available to taxpayers seeking
redress, and how the Reform Act’s fiduciary duty provisions would be enforced.
In conjunction with an urban redevelopment proposal, a hypothetical state-run
public authority in New York agrees to sell its land to a politically connected private
developer for $250,000 less than the fair market value, deliberately failing to conduct
research because the developer is one of the top campaign donors of one of the state’s
prominent mayors (the “Mayor”). The authority’s directors know that the Mayor has
pledged to “take care” of them when their terms on the board expire. Despite cries
from angry locals protesting the sale, the redevelopment project moves forward with
the board’s approval. With their objections ignored, citizens seek judicial intervention
Report, supra note 61, at 10.
71.

See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 11.

72. See id.
73. Norman Oder, What’s Violating Fiduciary Duty for a Public Authority?, Atlantic Yards Report (July

16, 2010), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2010/07/whats-violating-fiduciary-duty-for.html
(quoting Ira Millstein, Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Panel Discussion at the Albany Law
School Symposium: Discussion of the Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009 (Apr. 27, 2009), available
at http://www.totalwebcasting.com/view/?id=albanylaw). To illustrate the point, Millstein offers an
example of a board member sleeping during a meeting. Such conduct would only be actionable if the
board member went to the board meeting with the intention of sleeping. Id.
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to both halt the sale and hold the board members responsible for potentially negligent
and self-serving actions relating to the sale.74
However, New York State law currently provides a limited public remedy.
Specifically, in this hypothetical, the law would likely deny citizens standing to
obtain the relief they seek and would provide no private right of action. Furthermore,
despite the Reform Act’s stated purpose to increase the transparency and
accountability of public authority boards, taxpaying New Yorkers and the authorities
are unlikely to find themselves with legal recourse under the statute; this is partially
due to the bureaucratic and inefficient enforcement mechanisms already in place.75
Part A of this section examines how citizens will likely be found to lack both standing
and a private right of action, thus precluding them from challenging board decisions.
Part B analyzes the likely operation and effect of the Reform Act’s built-in
enforcement provisions after alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. This includes an
analysis of the official empowered with removal and whether those enforcement
provisions actually achieve the goals of the statute. This note concludes that the
Reform Act, as passed, lacks the capability to successfully deter and prevent
misconduct by public authority board members.
A. A Limited Public Remedy
1. Lack of Standing
The hypothetical above is loosely based on a case decided shortly before the
Reform Act’s passage. In Montgomery v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the
petitioners, who included a community advocacy group, alleged that the MTA failed
to comply with the competitive bidding provisions under the Public Authority
Accountability Act by selling a government rail yard to a private developer without
getting an appraisal and soliciting additional bids.76 The community group claimed
associational standing stemming from an interest in the Public Authority
Accountability Act’s “purpose of promoting accountability, transparency and ethics.” 77
74.

See the competitive bidding provisions of N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2897 (McKinney 2011).
[T]he award shall be made with reasonable promptness by notice to the responsible
bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to
the state, price and other factors considered; provided, that all bids may be rejected
when it is in the public interest to do so.
Id. This hypothetical scenario was modeled on Montgomery v. MTA, No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at
*1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 15, 2009). Of that case, the Reform Act sponsor, Richard Brodsky, suggested
that the MTA had breached its fiduciary duty. See Norman Oder, Brodsky: MTA Board’s Acceptance of
Ratner’s Lesser Offer for Railyard Would Violate its Fiduciary Duty, Atlantic Yards Report (June 8, 2009),
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/06/brodsky-mta-boards-acceptance-of.html.

75. See discussion infra Part III.B.
76. No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *9. In this instance the court found that the board of directors

had sufficient reasons for not soliciting additional bids. Id.
77.

Id. at *4. The court in Montgomery did not consider a possible breach of fiduciary duty because it had not
been alleged by petitioners. Also, the Reform Act had not yet taken effect to codify the fiduciary duties.
See id.
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The court dismissed the petitioner’s claims, finding they lacked standing because they
could not show injury in fact. The court ruled that the petitioner’s interests were
“indistinguishable from those of any other member of the general public.”78 At the
same time, however, Judge Stallman acknowledged in dicta that “hypothetically there
could be no way of judicially challenging what could be a clear violation of the
appraisal and bidding provisions.”79 He further noted that it “is appropriately within
the province of the Court of Appeals to consider whether a different standard for
standing should be applied.”80 The court therefore raised the question, but did not
decide, whether the inability of taxpayers to challenge the Public Authority
Accountability Act’s competitive bidding provisions posed an insurmountable barrier
to judicial review.81
The court’s recognition of this issue is noteworthy because it suggests that
permitting citizens to challenge the conduct of unelected board members might
serve an important public purpose.82 As the New York Court of Appeals asserted in
Dairylea Coop., Inc. v. Walkley, “[a] fundamental tenet of our system of remedies is
that when a government agency seeks to act in a manner adversely affecting a party,
judicial review of that action may be had.”83 However, for now, it is clear that under
Montgomery, ordinary citizens who cannot show injury in fact will not be able to
establish standing under the Public Authority Accountability Act and likely they
will be equally barred under the Reform Act.84
New York State Finance Law section 123-b, which provides an alternative
mechanism for citizens to establish standing without requiring injury in fact, does not
apply in the context of public authority decisionmaking.85 The statute allows taxpayers
78. Id. at *4. There are compelling reasons why broadening the standing requirements to allow these suits

may be dangerous. See In re Abrams v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990, 992 (1976); Soc’y of Plastics
(/-865 (85 085 (.385 ) 5 / )&%65 mm5 88h5 mlg65 mmh5 BgoogC5 B^"5 2#-.(5 ) 5 (5 #($/,35 #(5 .A(5
./&5 &!&5 -.%5 #(5 ."5 '..,5 #(!5 $/#.A(-/,-5 .".5 ."5 *,.35 -%#(!5 ,0#15 "-5 -)'5
concrete interest in prosecuting the action which casts the dispute ‘in a form traditionally capable of
judicial resolution.’”).
79. Id. at *4.
80. Montgomery, No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *5; see also Dairylea Coop., Inc. v. Walkley, 38

N.Y.2d 6 (1975) (citing a broader standard for recognizing standing).
81.

In re Abrams, 39 N.Y.2d 990. The court observed that “standing has been properly extended to permit an
appropriate judicial proceeding to prevent an illegal disbursement or to compel a legally required
disbursement of public funds. This extension has been made to prevent the erection of an impenetrable
barrier to judicial review of unlawful official action.” Id. at 992.

82. See generally Montgomery, No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *1.
83. 38 N.Y.2d at 10.
84. To date, no one has brought suit under the Reform Act.
85. N.Y. State Fin. Law § 123-b (McKinney 2011).

[A]ny person, who is a citizen taxpayer, whether or not such person is or may be affected
or specially aggrieved by the activity herein referred to, may maintain an action for
equitable or declaratory relief, or both, against an officer or employee of the state who in
the course of his or her duties has caused, is now causing, or is about to cause a wrongful
expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication, or any other illegal or unconstitutional
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to bring suit to prevent the “wrongful expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication”86
of state funds when there is a “sufficient nexus to fiscal activities of the State.”87 Thus,
for a citizen taxpayer to sue the government alleging waste, the conduct must be more
than unwiseA#.5 "-5 .)5 5 #&&!&888 However, the New York Court of Appeals has
exempted public authorities from such suits under the finance law.89 In New York Post
Corp. v. Moses, the court reasoned that public authorities are not agents of the state
because “they are independent and autonomous, deliberately designed to be able to
function freedom and f lexibility not permitted to an ordinary State board.” 90
Consequently, the taxpayer waste statute affords no redress for New Yorkers seeking to
challenge authority board decisions unless the conduct at issue is illegal.91
2. No Private Right of Action
While the Reform Act is silent on whether the fiduciary duty provisions confer a
private right of action for breach of such a duty, the statute’s legislative history is clear
that the drafters intended no such right.92 Even in the absence of legislative intent, it
is difficult to imagine a scenario that would satisfy the first prong of New York’s
#'*&#5 ,#!".5 ) 5 .#)(5 .-.A.".5 ."5 *&#(.# 5 &)(!5 .)5 ."5 &--5 ),5 1")-5
*,.#/&,5( #.5."5-../.51-5(.A/-5."5 ),'5.51-5.)5( #.5
the general public.93 Although the Sponsor’s Memorandum does not explain the
legislature’s justification for prohibiting standing by a private citizen, we may assume
it feared exposing authority boards to frivolous litigation that could impact their
disbursement of state funds or state property, except that the provisions of this subdivision
shall not apply to . . . any public corporation or public benefit corporation.
Id. There are other bases on which to bring citizen suits without direct injury; for example, a municipality’s
failure to comply with an Environmental Impact Statement in New York can be challenged pursuant to an
Article 78 proceeding.
86. Id.
87.

Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 805 (2003) (citation omitted).

88. Id. at 813–814.
89. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. N.Y. MTA., 799 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep’t 2005); New York Post Corp.

v. Moses, 10 N.Y.2d 199, 207 (1961) (holding that allowing taxpayer suits under the state finance law
“destroy[s] the ‘freedom and flexibility’ necessary for [the] functioning” of public authorities).
90. 10 N.Y.2d at 203–204 (quoting Plumbing Ass’n v. Thruway Auth., 5 N.Y.2d 420, 423 (1959)).
91.

While poor authority decisionmaking may be unethical and wasteful to taxpayers, it is not per se illegal.

92.

The legislative history states
Section 11-a of the bill would amend [the Public Authorities Law] to provide for the
removal by the appointing authority of an authority member who breaches his or her
fiduciary duty. Neither PAL § 2827 nor PAL § 2824(1) provide for, nor is it the intent
of this bill to create, a private right of action for a breach of fiduciary duty.
Legislative Memorandum, 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 506, § 11-a (McKinney) [hereinafter Legislative
Memorandum].

93.

Women’s Voices for the Earth, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 906 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
2010).
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ability to perform.94 Therefore, the legislature’s refusal to provide a private right of
action under the Reform Act serves as yet another barrier to citizen suits challenging
public authority board members’ conduct.
The legislature’s decision to protect public authority boards from time-consuming
and expensive citizen lawsuits was certainly rational, as opening the so-called
“floodgates” might prevent board members from carrying out their duties, fearful of
making necessary but unpopular decisions.95 One could easily imagine selfproclaimed “citizen heroes” bringing frivolous suits alleging breached fiduciary
duties.96 While public authority autonomy has led to abuses, it has also fostered
independent decisionmaking that has benefitted the public.97 Should authority
boards have to defend every decision in court, they may act or not act for fear of
liability rather than for the public good.
On the other hand, if the legislature strips the public of its ability to judicially
challenge negligent or self-dealing public authority boards, it should provide the
oversight and resources necessary to enforce the fiduciary duty provisions of the
Reform Act. However, an analysis of the Reform Act’s current enforcement provisions
reveals several significant weaknesses that undermine its goal of meaningful public
authority reform.
B. Enforcement of the Fiduciary Obligations under the Reform Act
1. Removal of Board Members for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The Reform Act sets forth a relatively straightforward procedure for the removal
of board members for misconduct. Pursuant to section 2827 of the Reform Act, a
board member can be removed for breach of fiduciary duty by “the public officer or
public body which is empowered . . . to appoint such authority.”98 Because of the
94. See Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993); see discussion of the legislators’ fears infra Part IV.
95. See discussion of Moses supra Part III.A.
96. However, this is not the case under taxpayer waste suits pursuant to N.Y. State Fin. Law § 123-b

(McKinney 2011). While the statistics regarding the frequency of taxpayer waste suits in New York
have not been compiled to this author’s knowledge, comprehensive searches on Westlaw, New York
State court web sites, and internet search engines support the inference that these claims are not
frequently litigated.
97.

CBC 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 4–5.

98. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2827 (McKinney 2011).

Removal of authority members. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every
member of every authority or commission heretofore or hereafter continued or created
by this chapter, except ex-officio members, that is, members whose membership results
by virtue of their incumbency of a public office, shall be removable by the public officer
or public body which is empowered by this chapter to appoint such authority or
commission member, for inefficiency, breach of fiduciary duty, neglect of duty or
misconduct in office, provided, however, that such member shall be given a copy of the
charges against him and an opportunity of being heard in person, or by counsel, in his
or her defense upon not less than ten days’ notice.
Id.
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diversity of public authorities throughout New York State, “[i]ndividual authorizing
statutes define the number of board members and assign responsibility for their
appointment.”99 In some circumstances, only the governor or county executive will
have removal power.100 Additionally, the Authorities Budget Office may investigate
and make removal recommendations to the appointing entity if it finds breaches of
fiduciary duties.101 Should those recommendations be disregarded, the ABO may
refer the matter to the Office of the Attorney General or local district attorney, who
may bring charges.102 Although this framework for enforcement initially appears
logical and efficient, in practice it is unworkable due to the prospect of cronyism and
the bureaucratic obstacles discussed below.103
2. A Weak Authorities Budget Office
The Authorities Budget Office may “initiate formal investigations, issue subpoenas,
publicly warn and censure public authorities for non-compliance and recommend the
suspension or dismissal of public authority board members and officers,” but lacks the
power of removal.104 Thus, while touted as a powerful, independent watchdog capable
of reining in negligent and self-dealing authority boards, the ABO emerges as just a
single voice with no direct removal power in a complex bureaucratic web.105 Without
the power of suspension or removal, it is unlikely the Authorities Budget Office will be
able to enforce the statute’s fiduciary duty provisions. Consequently, without legislative
action, remedies for board misconduct under the current law will have to come from
outside the Authorities Budget Office.106
99. Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, Public Authorities in New York State: Accelerating

Momentum to Achieve Reform 18 (2005), http://w w w.osc.state.ny.us/reports/pubauth/
pubauthoritiesreform.pdf.
100. The governor has appointment/removal power for board members of the MTA. Pub. Auth. § 2827. See

Press Release, N.Y. Governor’s Office David Paterson, Governor David Paterson Appoints Jay Walder
to Serve as CEO and Chair of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (July 14, 2009), http://www.
governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/press/press_0714092.html.
101. Pub. Auth. § 2827.
102. Id.
103. For examples of misconduct, see Reining in New York’s Secret Government, supra note 12, at 30–38.
104. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 18.
105. A New York Times article published in 2009 reflects the political rhetoric that exaggerates the ABO’s

power under the Reform Act by reporting that the ABO may “initiate the suspension or removal of
board members.” There is no such statutory language. See Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Signs Bill to
Rein in State’s Free-Spending Public Authorities, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2009, at A14, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/nyregion/12authorities.html?_r=1.
106. Although administrative and procedural checks exist for public authorities, such as the New York Public

Authorities Control Board (PACB), these checks are relatively powerless to deter breaches of fiduciary
duty. For example, the PACB serves to approve any project-related financings by public authorities. See
Department of Health of the State of New York Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 2011A,
Dormitory Authority of the State of New York 29 (2011), http://www.dasny.org/dasny/OS_
fiscal_1112/Downloads/DOHRefudingFinalOS.pdf.
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In addition to its limited statutory enforcement powers, the Authorities Budget
Office lacks the resources to succeed in its objectives. According to its 2010 Annual
Report, the Authorities Budget Office “has neither the resources nor the time to
independently evaluate the veracity of all the information it receives.”107 The Task
Force report on the Reform Act’s implementation corroborates this finding.108
Currently, the Authorities Budget Office only employs eight full-time staff members
and has an operating budget of less than $1.8 million.109 While the Reform Act
assumes that the Authorities Budget Office will delegate work to state agencies, such
as the Office of Comptroller and Attorney General,110 it is inconceivable that these
eight individuals could actively monitor the state’s 1100 plus public authorities. It is
not clear if and when Albany will allocate the additional funding necessary for the
Authorities Budget Office to establish a meaningful presence.
A brief examination of public authority compliance with the mandatory reporting
requirements of the Reform Act, since its passage, underscores the ABO’s limited
ability to provide the oversight with which it has been entrusted.111 While state public
authorities have generally adhered to the new reporting requirements, the Authorities
Budget Office has failed to compel local public authority compliance.112 In fact, for
the 2010 reporting period, only fifty-six percent of local public authorities adhered to
the new annual reporting requirements, up only six percent from 2009.113 Under the
Reform Act, each authority is responsible for the compilation and accuracy of
reported data.114 However, it is questionable whether boards who have violated their
fiduciary duties will actively and properly disclose certain information. This note
posits, the Authorities Budget Office’s rule requiring an authority’s chief financial
officer to verify the data reported provides “some assurance” of accuracy is simply
unrealistic because individuals are unlikely to disclose their misdeeds.115 Consequently,
107. 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7, at 12.
108. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 21 (“[T]he ABO does not have sufficient staff to undertake

an analysis of debt practices, study the consolidation, restructuring or reformation of authorities,
conduct simultaneous on site reviews, or to focus on other issues of importance.”).
109. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 3; Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, 2009–2010

Executive Budget, Authorities Budget Office (2010), http://www.budget.state.ny.us/pubs/
archive/fy0910archive/eBudget0910/agencyPresentations/appropData/authorityBudgetOffice.html
(last visited Nov. 13 2010).
110. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 18.
111. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 1.
112. Id. at 1.
113. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 10; 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7, at 11. This figure excludes

industrial development agencies and local development corporation. According to the ABO, there is an
^/(*.&5 ,.5 ) 5 )'*&#(5 35 ,.#(5 .!),#-5 ) 5 &)&5 */&#5 /."),#.#-A*,#',#&35 /,(5
renewal and community development agencies.” 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 10.
114. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 11.
115. See id. (“The requirement that the Chief Executive or Chief Fiscal officer certify as to the accuracy and

completeness of the data, coupled with the board’s approval, should provide the ABO with some
assurance that the information is reliable for analytical and public disclosure purposes.”)
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it is expected that a chief financial officer who is responsible for authorizing or
engaging in misspending will openly disclose it to the Authorities Budget Office.
Although the Authorities Budget Office proclaims the ability to sanction noncomplying authorities, it is not clear how those penalties will be carried out and
whether they will deter non-compliance.
3. Enforcement to Date
Although the Authorities Budget Office has conducted compliance reports and
published its findings, it has only fully pursued one enforcement action to date.116 In
April 2010, the Authorities Budget Office recommended dismissal of the entire
board of the New York State Theatre Institute, but did so only after the State
Inspector General reported that the director of the board improperly used state funds
for personal benefit.117 The Authorities Budget Office immediately reviewed the
Inspector General’s report and recommended the board’s removal pursuant to its
authority.118 The next month, Governor Paterson dissolved the board.119
While this enforcement action was consistent with the Reform Act’s objectives,
the ABO took action per its statutory mandate only after the Inspector General
made its recommendation.120 Therefore, it appears that the Authorities Budget
Office’s responsibilities are largely duplicative of other agencies. This view echoes
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s belief that the Reform Act does little
and merely “sets up another level of bureaucracy.”121 In the Theatre Institute case, it
is unclear why the Inspector General could not simply recommend the dissolution of
the Theatre Institute. The Authorities Budget Office did little more than “rubber
stamp” the Inspector General’s findings and did not pursue its own investigation. In
no circumstance can such action be deemed to satisfy the rigorous exercise of
meaningful enforcement envisioned by the legislature.122

116. 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7, at 8.
117. State of N.Y. Office of the Inspector General, Report of Investigation of the New York

State Theatre Institute (2010), http://ig.state.ny.us/pdfs/Reportof InvestigationoftheNewYorkState
TheaterInstitute.pdf.
118. 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7, at 9.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Gabe Pressman, Public Authority Reform Bill May Lose in City Hall, NBC N.Y. (July 29, 2009, 7:55 AM),

http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local-beat/PublicAuthorityreform.html (“The mayor’s press
secretary Stu Loeser said Bloomberg was opposed to this legislation for two main reasons, ‘It sets up
another level of bureaucracy,’ he says, ‘and it requires people who sit on authorities to often consider only
what’s best for the authority.’”).
122. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 18 (“The Task Force believes that the recommendation for

removal power granted to the ABO under [the Reform Act] is a meaningful enforcement measure, and
that the ABO should rigorously exercise it to ensure compliance.”).
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4. Liability as a Deterrent
Unlike private shareholders in the corporate governance model, the Reform Act
precludes taxpaying “shareholders” from challenging negligent exercises of discretion
by board members relegating enforcement to an underfunded, statutorily weak
agency. While private shareholders have the potential to be made whole if a directordefendant’s actions do not qualify for business judgment protection, citizens wronged
by public authority board misconduct have no real remedy under the Reform Act.
The Reform Act’s sponsor, former Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, acknowledged
the difficulties in enforcing the fiduciary provisions. He stated that “the consequence
of [establishing that board members may be removed for violation of fiduciary duties]
#-5().5"/!5#(5."5&!&5-(-85/.5#.51-5"/!5#(5."5*)&#.#&5-(-A 5)(].5'(5
*,.#-(5 -(-A#(5 .".5 #.5 ,'#(5 0,3)35 .".5 ."5 ),5 '',-5 "5 5
fiduciary duty.”123 However, such a statement cannot be reconciled with the legislative
intent of effecting real, meaningful change in authority governance. Merely
“reminding” public authority board members will not truly deter misconduct; holding
them personally liable (i.e. legal liability) will.124 Without such enforcement, the
Reform Act becomes nothing more than an idealistic repackaging of the Public
Authority Accountability Act.
IV. MEANINGFUL ENFORCEMENT REQUIRES MEANINGFUL CHANGE

The Reform Act’s fiduciary duty provisions must be enforceable in a manner that
will lead to positive changes in public authority governance practices. The Reform
Act’s current framework and its reliance on the corporate governance model, while
innovative, not only lacks the ability to deter future misconduct, but fails to provide
redress to citizens harmed by improper board decisionmaking. An effective statute
must have these characteristics. This section first explores proposals that could
strengthen the enforcement mechanisms of the Reform Act and then advocates for
solutions that can realistically achieve greater transparency and accountability in
public authorities.125
A. The Prospect of Citizen Enforcement
To date, no citizen-plaintiff has alleged a violation of the fiduciary duty provisions
of the Reform Act against a public authority board or board member. However, the
time may soon come when the courts will see such a challenge. In fact, the pre123. Norman Oder, MTA Board’s Acceptance of Ratner’s Lesser Offer for Railyard Would Violate its Fiduciary

Duty, Atlantic Yards Report (June 8, 2009), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2010/07/
whats-violating-fiduciary-duty-for.html (quoting Richard Brodsky, PARA’s Sponsor at the Albany Law
School Symposium: Public Authorities Law: Maintaining the Balance (June 3, 2009)).
124. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal

Liability, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 393, 438–39 (2005) (discussing studies which show that “increasing the
certainty of legal sanctions effectively deters [corporate] misconduct”).
125. See Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8 (“ This legislation includes many of those recommendations

and others intended to improve public authority operations and oversight.”).

1585

TURNING THE LIGHTS ON

Reform Act case Montgomery, discussed above, illustrates a situation in which the
public may wish to hold public authority board members accountable for breached
fiduciary duties.126 As public authorities are so pervasively involved in government,
there is little doubt that members of the public will seek judicial review of public
authority action.127 In these cases, authority board members, and not the authority
itself, will likely be the defendants.
1. The Case for Citizen Enforcement
Because public authority board decisions affect the daily lives of taxpayers and
their communities, citizens have a fundamental interest in preventing board
misconduct. Like shareholders of a private corporation, they should have the authority
to hold the board accountable for negligent and self-serving decisions that adversely
affect their community.128 While this is not to suggest that taxpayers have the same
risks and interests at stake as private shareholders, taxpayers should be entitled to the
independent and careful decisionmaking of public authority board members.129 This
is because authority board decisions can directly affect the lives of citizens. It is
reasonable to suggest that these individuals should have a remedy for misconduct.
Whether an authority board votes on an urban renewal plan, construction of a
"#!"1365 ),5 /&./,&5 #(#.#.#065 ),5 #-#)(-5 (5 "05 .(!#&5 )(-+/(-A
)."5!))5(5A)(5-..5(5&)&5#(.,-.-8130
Citizen involvement in the enforcement of the fiduciary duty provisions of the
Reform Act may also result in better oversight of non-compliant local public authorities.
This is because citizens have a vested interest in the allocation of their tax dollars and
may be more willing to judicially challenge or report evidence of misconduct than
government officials. Although the Authorities Budget Office maintains that it will
investigate any complaint against a public authority, it lacks the resources to effectively
126. Montgomery v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County

Dec. 15, 2009).
127. Wilson Memo, supra note 3, at 22.

It is time to return public authorities to their core mission, restore control over Statefunded authority debt to New York’s taxpayers and expose authority operations to
systematic oversight. While public authorities provide important services and support
for New York’s critical infrastructure, lasting reform will help the State ensure longterm fiscal stability, affordability and transparency.
Id.
128. See Note, Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, 105 Har.

L. Rev. 1590, 1596 (1992) (“Like shareholders in a business corporation, nonprofit members have a
large stake in controlling the directors’ activities because they are directly served by the organization.”).
129. Because of the infinite factual scenarios that may amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, this note

contends that the question of when authority misconduct may be litigated is for the courts to decide. A
general principle might be that litigation is warranted when there are measurable damages.
130. The 2010 MTA fare hikes serve an example of these tangible consequences. See Michael M. Grynbaum,

M.T.A. Approves Transit Fare Increases, N.Y. Times City Room Blog (Oct. 7, 2010, 11:31 AM), http://
cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/m-t-a-meets-to-increase-transit-fares.
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accomplish this.131 The statistics representing the number of local authorities that failed
to comply with reporting requirements support the inference that the Authorities
Budget Office cannot enforce the Reform Act.132 In July 2010, the New York Times
reported that “175 public authorities did not provide annual reports” and “of the annual
reports filed, 21 percent had significant data errors.”133 The following year the
Authorities Budget Office reported the persistence of significant data errors and poor
compliance rates, noting “there is a continued concern that some authorities are not
taking the time to ensure their information is accurate and complete.”134 Thus, one
)/&5,!/5.".5.")-5 '#&#,51#."5."5'..,-5 ),5&)&5/."),#.#-A."5#.#4(-5
 .535/."),#.35),5#-#)(-A'355..,51.")!-5."(5."5/."),#.#-5
Budget Office and could better enforce the fiduciary duty provisions through judicial
intervention. Citizens have a wealth of resources available ranging from advocacy
groups to self-funded initiatives that the state government does not have the resources
to provide. Further, citizens, unlike public authority board members, do not have
similar conflicts of interest in reporting perceived misconduct.
The alternative to citizen enforcement is the time-consuming process requiring a
citizen to report the misconduct to the Authorities Budget Office; thereafter the
citizen must wait for an investigation, a report, and finally a recommendation. In the
time it takes the Authorities Budget Office to issue its findings, board members can
continue to engage in conduct violating the Reform Act. These reasons favor giving
taxpaying citizens a limited role in the enforcement of the fiduciary duty provisions
of the Reform Act.
2. The Case Against Citizen Enforcement
While easing standing requirements to facilitate the bringing of suits by “harmed”
community members seems like a logical and efficient way to stop misconduct, the
costs may outweigh the benefits. In In re Abrams, the New York Court of Appeals laid
out the case against granting citizen standing to challenge public authority decisions.135
In finding for the MTA in a noise-related nuisance case, the court noted that “[t]o
allow such actions would in effect attempt displacement . . . of the lawful acts of
appointive and elective officials charged with the management of the public
enterprises.”136 Perhaps fearing the emergence of frivolous lawsuits, the court concluded
that “the ultimate public remedy against poor government management is at the voting
machine. Neglect, inefficiency, and erroneous but reasonably made exercise of judgment
131. Ceasar, supra note 6.
132. Id.
133. Id. This also supports the conclusion that the ABO lacks enforcement capability. Though the 2011

Annual Report showed an improvement of approximately thirty-three percent from 2010, that number
is not necessarily accurate as it reflects reports that were identified for “re-submit status,” meaning there
were still significant data errors in the initial filings.
134. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 11.
135. In re Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990 (1976).
136. Id. at 992.
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fall short of illegality.”137 Under this view, reform should come from elected
representatives, not the judiciary. Broadening standing requirements to allow claims by
citizens who have not suffered a direct injury “would disrupt government operation by
posing the threat of litigation to challenge any governmental action.”138
Furthermore, even if New York courts were to recognize standing more broadly,
a plaintiff would have to convince a court that the Reform Act contains a private
right of action, a contention that runs contrary to the legislative intent.139 The court
in Women’s Voices for the Earth, Inc. v Procter & Gamble Co. recognized this principle,
finding that even if the petitioners, an environmental organization, could show
standing in an Article 78140 proceeding, their suit could not proceed because no
private right of action existed under the challenged statute.141 Consequently, a claim
against a public authority board is actionable as a common law suit alleging a breach
of fiduciary duty only after standing has been shown.142 However, given the legislative
intent to preclude such actions, it is unlikely a court would entertain a common law
suit claiming breach of fiduciary duty.143 To enable a private right of action, the
legislature would need to amend the Reform Act.
It remains to be seen whether broadening standing to allow citizen suits against
public authority board members would in reality “open the floodgates” to litigation
against public authorities. Traditionally, taxpayer waste suits have not been frivolously
brought, and there is no reason to believe that claims against public authority board
members would be any different.144 Coupled with the high cost of litigation and
strict pleading requirements, it is unlikely that allowing taxpayers to challenge board
misconduct would be detrimental to public board operations.145
137. Id. at 993; see Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. N.Y. Metro. Transp. Auth., 799 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep’t

2005); see also Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner 59 N.Y.2d 314, 334 (1983) (stating
“invasions of rights common to all of the public should be left to be remedied by action by public
officials” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C, cmt. b (1979)).
138. Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 813 (2003).
139. Legislative Memorandum, supra note 92.
140. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803 (McKinney 2012) (An Article 78 proceeding allows a challenge to “a determination

[that] was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and
capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty
or discipline imposed.”).
141. Women’s Voices for the Earth, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co. 906 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.

County 2010).
142. See Doe v. Cmty. Health Plan-Kaiser Corp., 709 N.Y.S.2d 215, 218 (3d Dept. 2000) (“ While a private

cause of action may not be predicated on . . . [the statue], these statutes define and impose the scope of
the actionable duty of confidentiality.”). Thus it could be argued that the Public Authority Accountability
Act imposes an actionable common law claim for breach of fiduciary duty. A common law breach could
be negligence.
143. Id. at 217.
144. See supra note 96.
145. See generally Robert Corn-Revere, Narrow Issue of Taxpayer Standing Highlights Wide Divisions Among the

Justices, 2006–07 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 215 (2007).
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3. A Hybrid Solution
While citizens should have a voice in challenging board member conduct,
allowing them standing could theoretically disrupt public authority operations in a
manner inconsistent with the Public Authority Accountability Act and the Reform
Act.146 However, this does not mean the public should be completely excluded from
enforcement. Thus a scheme allowing limited citizen participation without easing
standing requirements would likely serve the legislative intent.
The Authorities Budget Office should first develop a user-friendly reporting
system that collects complaints about authority board conduct from concerned
citizens and then responds in a reasonable period of time. Currently, the New York
State Attorney General serves as the designated complaint forum against public
authorities.147 The Attorney General’s website merely directs parties to fill out
general forms, which cannot be submitted online.148 It is not clear how quickly the
complaints are reviewed by the Attorney General’s Office and how long it takes
before matters are investigated. However, it can be inferred that complaints against a
public authority are somewhat delayed in reaching the Authorities Budget Office.
It is therefore essential that the Authorities Budget Office add a “citizen’s corner”
on its website, which explains the fiduciary duty provisions in plain English and
provides an easy mechanism to submit questions and complaints. For example, if a
citizen learns or suspects that a public authority board engaged in self-dealing or
negligent conduct, he could then easily learn about the requisite fiduciary duties of the
Reform Act and file a complaint electronically. This would allow meaningful citizen
participation without broadening standing requirements or encouraging frivolous
lawsuits. Additionally, this solution would lead to a more efficient and effective
reporting system, which would be relatively easy and cost-efficient to implement.
If these initiatives fail, the legislature should consider either amending State
Finance Law section 123-b to allow standing without establishing injury in fact, or
enacting new legislation to allow taxpayer suits against public authority board
members. Although fears of opening the “floodgates” are reasonable, it is far from
certain whether frivolous suits will in fact be brought and whether such suits would
be detrimental to public authority board operations. Given this often-cited concern,

146. See Montgomery v. MTA, No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 15,

2009) (finding that the delay resulting from citizens suits “would only cause uncertainty about the
projects and likely increase both public and private expense”). This is contrary to objectives of the
Reform Act, which called for raising “transparency standards” while maintaining “the authorities’
ability to promote economic development.” Press Release, supra note 4.
147. The New York State Attorney General is responsible for enforcing the Public Authority Law. See

generally Accelerating Momentum to Achieve Reform, supra note 99 (providing examples of
attorney general enforcement).
148. See Filing a Consumer Complaint, Consumer Frauds Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, http://

www.ag.ny.gov/bureaus/consumer_frauds/filing_a_consumer_complaint.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2012); see also Investigations Unit of the Legal Services Division, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller,
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/investigations/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
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a first step should be a government study of taxpayer waste suits in New York that
examines their frequency and estimates hardships imposed on the state.
B. A Stronger Authorities Budget Office
As the Task Force acknowledged, the state should strengthen the Authorities
Budget Office to accomplish its mission.149 This can be achieved through additional
staff, funding, and active enforcement.150
First, it is imperative that the Authorities Budget Office increase its staff
significantly. Compared to other state agencies, the Authorities Budget Office is
disproportionately small. For example, while the 2010 projected number of staff for
the Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities was
101 and the State Racing and Wagering Board was ninety-nine, the Authorities
Budget Office reported only eleven.151 Additionally, the Authorities Budget Office is
charged with overseeing more than 490 entities that affect the entire state, while the
Commission on Quality of Care administers a “statewide network of over 30
0)35(5--#-.#05."()&)!35)(.,.5!(#-_A5'/"5-'&&,5)(-.#./(38152
As the Task Force recommends, the creation of thirty more positions is essential to
meet the responsibilities of the Reform Act because the ABO “does not have
sufficient staff to undertake an analysis of debt practices, study the consolidation,
restructuring or reformation of authorities, conduct simultaneous on site reviews, or
to focus on other issues of importance.”153
Second, increased funding for the Authorities Budget Office is essential for
enforcement. The Task Force found that new funding should be directed toward
“developing the capability . . . for . . . investigating potential violations of a board’s
fiduciary duty, executive mismanagement, or alleged acts of misconduct uncovered
during the course of its official business.”154 Additionally, the Authorities Budget
Office currently lacks funding to employ a deputy director for examinations and
enforcement, as well as its own legal counsel.155 Therefore, without additional
funding, the Authorities Budget Office will not be able to attract the competent and
capable experts necessary to meet the Reform Act’s objectives.
While additional funding will certainly increase the Authorities Budget Office’s
ability to investigate and act against breaches of fiduciary duties, it will not in itself
deter authority boards from misconduct. Given the time it takes to investigate and
149. Task Force Report, supra note 61.
150. Id. at 19–22. Increased education and training has also been recommended, but is not discussed here.
151. Id. at 20.
152. See Strategic Plan 2008–2010, N.Y. State Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for

Persons with Disabilities, available at http://cqc.ny.gov/about/about-the-commission/strategic-plan
(last visited Jan. 18 2012).; see also 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29.
153. Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 21.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 20–21.
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remove a board, it is unclear if a bigger, smarter, and better-funded Authorities Budget
Office will alone influence authority board decisionmaking. This is an important
issue because the Reform Act seeks deterrence as much as it seeks accountability.156
As a result, it is necessary for the Authorities Budget Office to exercise, and be able to
exercise, its powers to the fullest extent under the Reform Act.
C. The IRS Enforcement Model of Private Foundation Governance
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) contains fiduciary duty provisions for private
non-profit foundations that are similar to those contemplated under the Reform
Act.157 However, unlike the Reform Act, the IRC provides a strong enforcement
mechanism for breaches of fiduciary duties in the form of fines.158 An examination of
the similarities between private non-profit boards and public authority boards
suggests that the IRC model of fiduciary duty enforcement would work well when
applied to public authorities.
Under the IRC, private non-profit board members have a duty of care and are
subject to a prohibition on self-dealing.159 Congress sought to “prevent abuses by certain
privately controlled charitable entities” such as use of “such assets by the foundations to
accumulate income . . . to invest in overly risky ventures, to engage in self-dealing
transactions . . . or to promote political or other noncharitable objectives.”160 These
regulatory governance goals echo the legislative intent of the Reform Act. Like the
Authorities Budget Office, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) initially had difficulty
156. This is evidenced by the emphasis on training as well as the acknowledgment of the fiduciary duties.

N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2824(2) (McKinney 2011).
Individuals appointed to the board of a public authority shall participate in state
approved training regarding their legal, fiduciary, financial and ethical responsibilities
as directors of an authority within one year of appointment to a board. Board members
shall participate in such continuing training as may be required to remain informed of
best practices, regulatory and statutory changes relating to the effective oversight of the
management and financial activities of public authorities and to adhere to the highest
standards of responsible governance.
Id.
157. See 26 U.S.C. § 4944 (2006) (imposing taxes on a private foundation and, in certain cases, its

management, for making investments that “ jeopardize the carrying out of any of [the foundation’s]
exempt purposes”); 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
158. See 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
159. Id.

[T]here is hereby imposed on the participation of any foundation manager in an act of
self-dealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation, knowing that it is
such an act, a tax equal to 5 percent of the amount involved with respect to the act of selfdealing for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period, unless such participation is
not willful and is due to reasonable cause. The tax imposed by this paragraph shall be
paid by any foundation manager who participated in the act of self-dealing.
Id.
160. Hammond v. U.S., 764 F.2d 88, 88 (2d Cir. 1985); see also 26 U.S.C. § 508 (2006).
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enforcing the fiduciary duty provisions applicable to foundation managers; it also
lacked the resources and remedies to ensure compliance.161
In contemplating a mechanism for the enforcement of fiduciary duty provisions
on all non-profit corporation boards, a Harvard Law Review article posits that “a
relaxation of standing requirements is unlikely to enhance the enforcement of
fiduciary duties.”162 The article suggests that a better approach would be to “increase
deterrence by enhancing the punishment for fiduciary duty violations rather than by
increasing the chance that a breaching director will be caught.” 163 The article
concludes by proposing a remedy modeled on the IRC, which fines directors of
private foundations for self-dealing.164
Under this self-dealing statute, the IRS may impose “a tax on each act of selfdealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation.”165 Additionally, if
corrective action is not taken, the IRS can levy a tax equal to fifty percent of the
amount involved, and all board members can be held jointly and severally liable.166
The organization itself is not penalized.167 While the IRC does not explicitly
prescribe a duty of care, a board will be sanctioned for making investment decisions
that “jeopardize [its] charitable purpose.”168 Officers who are found in violation of
this section are subject to “a tax equal to 10 percent of the amount . . . unless such
participation is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.”169
In essence, the IRC aims to deter self-dealing and breaches of the duty of care by
private non-profit board members through the threat of additional taxes.170 The IRC
161. Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128, at

1600.
162. Id. at 1607.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 26 U.S.C. § 4941. The word “disqualified” is defined under section 4946. For the purpose of this note,

we will assume a public authority board member with a conf lict of interest would fall under this
category. For example, if a public authority board member had a substantial investment in a corporation,
he would be prohibited from voting to give a valuable contract to that corporation.
166. 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
167. John A. Edie, Forum of Regional Assocs. of Grantmakers, Self Dealing: A Concise Guide

For Foundation Board and Staff (2008), http://www.cof.org/f iles/Documents/Family_
Foundations/Legal-and-Tax-Issues/Self-Dealing-Guide-for-Foundation-Board-and-Staff.pdf.
168. 26 U.S.C. § 4944.
169. Id.
170. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128,

at 1607–08.
Assume that D, a director of a public benefit nonprofit corporation and sole owner of a
bank, arranges for the corporation to obtain a loan from his bank. Interest on the loan
has a present value equal to $100 more than loans available at other banks. In other
words, D is willing to sacrifice $100 of the corporation’s assets to increase his bank’s
profits by $100 . . . . If D is a risk neutral individual who is indifferent to the means by
which he makes a profit . . . he will engage in the prohibited transaction described
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model has been effective because the harsh financial consequences present a strong
incentive for board members to act in the best interest of their organization.171 The
small number of enforcement actions highlights this model’s effectiveness.172
Adapting the IRC model to the public authorities law would allow for
substantially better enforcement of the Reform Act’s fiduciary duty provisions.173
While the Authorities Budget Office does not currently have the power to fine, it
does have the general power to discipline public authorities.174 Even though the
Authorities Budget Office does not explicitly possess the statutory power to fine
delinquent authority boards and their members, a court may interpret the statute,
based on the legislative intent, to infer that the Authorities Budget Office has
permissible fining capabilities. Pursuant to Title II, Section 6 of the Reform Act, the
Authorities Budget Office may institute a judicial proceeding to obtain requested
documentation of non-compliant public authorities.175 If courts decline to recognize
the Authorities Budget Office’s power to fine, the legislature should amend the
Reform Act by specifically including such a provision allowing it.
The rationale for imposing fines on authority board directors is analogous to that
of the IRS imposed fines on private non-profit foundation boards through additional
taxes. First, the Authorities Budget Office, like the IRS, has limited resources to
monitor a board’s compliance with fiduciary duties.176 Second, fine proceeds
above as long as the expected gain from the transaction is positive. . . . If the penalty for
self-dealing is set so that D simply returns any improperly obtained profits to the
corporation, D will choose to breach his fiduciary duty as long as the probability of
being caught is less than 100%. . . . Although D would not be deterred by a relaxation
of the standing requirements, D would be effectively deterred by an increase in the penalty
for the violation of fiduciary duties. Assuming that D will be caught 50% of the time, a
penalty equal to twice the amount of D’s improper profit ($200) will deter D from
engaging in the activity altogether. With a penalty of $200, D’s expected gain from the
transaction equals zero, and D has no incentive to breach the duty of loyalty.
Id. (emphasis added).
171. See Adams v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 373, 384 (1978) (after determining that petitioner “engaged in acts of

self-dealing,” the court considered “whether the initial 5-percent excise tax imposed by section 4941(a) is
applicable”).
172. See 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7; 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29 (the relevant information is

located under the “Enforcement” sub-heading). See generally Developments in the Law-Nonprofit
Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128.
173. Self-dealing falls under the “duty of loyalty.” See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra

note 128, at 1603.
174. See New York State Commission on Public Authority Reform Report, supra note 13, at 9

(“ Where the ABO has formally found an authority to be in material non-compliance or otherwise at
fault, the ABO should be authorized to impose disciplinary measures ranging from formal warnings, to
public censure, or to recommend . . . suspension or dismissal of officers or directors.”).
175. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 6 (McKinney 2011). The ABO may “commence a special proceeding in

supreme court, when it does not receive from a state or local authority upon request information, books,
records or other documentation necessary to perform its duties.” Id. (emphasis added).
176. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128,

at 1599–1600.
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compensate those who have suffered harm as a consequence of board decisionmaking.
“Removal” is largely a symbolic disciplinary measure, it cannot tangibly compensate
those harmed for the losses incurred. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, fines
are an efficient deterrent “[b]ecause it is less expensive to increase a fine than to
increase the level of enforcement, the optimal level of undeterred breaches will be
lower when fines are levied on breaching directors.”177 What is less clear in imposing
fines under the Reform Act is who will be fined, what an appropriate fine will be,
and who will benefit from the fine. To answer these questions, the following sections
revisit the urban redevelopment hypothetical discussed in Part II and explore the
application of the IRC’s self-dealing provisions to public authority boards.
1. Who will be fined?
In the hypothetical, a public authority board sold public land to a private
developer in bad faith. Under the IRS model of fiduciary duty enforcement, fines
may be levied on foundation managers (the board) who self-deal with a “disqualified
person.”178 Here, the developer would fall under this category because he is a
“substantial contributor” to the foundation.179 The transaction would be considered
self-dealing because the board gets improper benefits by appeasing the Mayor. Thus,
after an investigation, the Authorities Budget Office or Attorney General would be
able to impose fines on the board for breaching their duty of loyalty by acting out of
political pressure rather than pursuant to their fiduciary duties.
2. What is an appropriate fine?
Determining the “right” financial penalty is a difficult task because a fiduciary
duty, alone, does not have a value. How does one compute the value of loyalty? The
177. Id. at 1609.
178. 26 U.S.C. § 4941 (2012).

For purposes of this subchapter, the term “disqualified person” means, with respect to a
*,#0.5 )/(.#)(65 5 *,-)(5 1")5 #-ABC5 5 -/-.(.#&5 )(.,#/.),5 .)5 ."5 )/(.#)(65
(B) a foundation manager (within the meaning of subsection (b)(1)), (C) an owner of
'),5."(5hf5*,(.5) AB#C5."5.).&5)'#(50).#(!5*)1,5) 55),*),.#)(65B##C5."5
profits interest of a partnership, or (iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated
enterprise, which is a substantial contributor to the foundation . . . .
26 U.S.C. § 4946(a).
179. 26 U.S.C. § 4946; 26 U.S.C. § 507 (2006). For purposes of this analysis, the term “foundation” should

be construed to include the current political regime or those making the decisions. A “substantial
contributor” refers to
any person who contributed or bequeathed an aggregate amount of more than $5,000 to
the private foundation, if such amount is more than 2 percent of the total contributions
and bequests received by the foundation before the close of the taxable year of the
foundation in which the contribution or bequest is received by the foundation from such
person. In the case of a trust, the term “substantial contributor” also means the creator
of the trust.
26 U.S.C. § 507(d)(2)(A).
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answer is quite subjective and will vary.180 Fines too low would not deter the conduct at
issue, while excessive fines might prevent members from serving on boards or engaging
in “good” self-dealing transactions that would benefit the authority and the public at
large.181 Therefore, the logical approach is to calculate the damages resulting from the
breach, which is precisely what the IRC prescribes.182 Under the statute, “a tax equal to
5 percent of the amount involved with respect to the act of self-dealing for each year (or
part thereof) in the taxable period” is imposed on the foundation manager.183
In the hypothetical scenario, the board sold land for $250,000 below fair market
value. Applying the IRC penalty, each board member who breached his duty of
loyalty by accepting the lower bid in bad faith would initially be fined $12,500.
Although this figure does not compensate for $250,000 in damages, the IRC statute
contemplates that the non-profit’s board would take remedial measures.184
Furthermore, under the IRS self-dealing statute, “if a foundation manager refused to
agree to part or all of the correction, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 50 percent
of the amount involved” which is to be paid by the foundation manager.185 Therefore,
."5 */&#5 /."),#.35 ),5 '',-5 )/&5 5 #(5 /*5 .)5 qghk6fffA5 -/-.(.#&5
sum likely to deter misconduct.
Critics of this proportional system of fines may assert that this will not deter
breaches of fiduciary duty as public authority board members are indemnified by
statute. Pursuant to Public Officers Law section 18, officers of public authorities are
indemnified for any judgment or settlement claim against them, provided they acted
within the scope of their duties.186 However, as the Third Department noted in
Wyman v. Zeltins, “[t]he statute . . . is optional and only applies if adopted by a local
180. Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director Liability, 37 Duq. L. Rev. 557, 565

(1999). Under the IRC, “[t]he determination of whether compensation is reasonable and whether the
decision to give it was adequately considered is determined on the basis of all of the facts and
circumstances.” Id.
181. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128,

at 1610.
182. 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
183. Id.
184. See Adams v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 81 (1979) (“[T]he clear intent of Congress reflected in the language of

section 4941(b)(1) and in the accompanying legislative history, is to condition a self-dealer’s liability for
the second-level tax upon his failure to undertake corrective action within the correction period.”).
185. 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
186. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 18 (McKinney 2011).

The public entity shall indemnify and save harmless its employees in the amount of any
judgment obtained against such employees in a state or federal court, or in the amount
of any settlement of a claim, provided that the act or omission from which such
judgment or claim arose occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his
public employment or duties; provided further that in the case of a settlement the duty
to indemnify and save harmless shall be conditioned upon the approval of the amount
of settlement by the governing body of the public entity.
Id.
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governing body.”187 In fact, most authorities will indemnify their officers unless there
is a breach of fiduciary duty. For example, the MTA’s bylaws provide indemnification
“unless such individual is determined by the Authority or its designee not to have
acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he or she reasonably believed to be in the
best interests of the Authority or of its subsidiaries or affiliates.”188
Even if there is no indemnification for breach of fiduciary duty, there is still a
question of whether the board member “act[ed] within the scope of his public
employment or duties.”189 Because public authorities will usually not indemnify board
members who have acted in bad faith, the imposition of fines remains an effective
deterrent.
3. Redressabilitly
The IRC model properly compensates societal “harm” caused by private nonprofit foundation board misconduct through redistribution.190 Since damages
awarded to plaintiffs might be an incentive to bring frivolous lawsuits, a better
alternative would be to direct the revenue generated by the fine to the Authorities
Budget Office. The Authorities Budget Office could use a percentage of the money
to take corrective measures relating the misconduct, and then fund its operating
expenses. This would give the Authorities Budget Office the necessary resources to
provide active enforcement and would also compensate taxpayers who have taken on
the burden of policing authority board misconduct. In the hypothetical, for example,
if the $125,000 fine had been collected by the Authorities Budget Office, the money
could go back to the locality and be indirectly distributed to those affected citizens
pursuant to an approved formula.191
Although it is clear that public authorities are different from non-profit
corporations in mission and function, both entities suffer from what Professor
,035 )&-"'#5 "-5 '5 5 ^*,)&'.#5 *,)2_A.".5 ."#,5 ) #,-5
“generally operate under the same state fiduciary standards as their for-profit peers,
but, in contrast to the for-profit world, fiduciary law plays little role in assuring
accountability in the nonprofit sector.”192 Therefore, the IRC model of imposing
fines for breaches of fiduciary duties could be a valuable and meaningful step in
“reining in” New York public authorities.193
187. 531 N.Y.S.2d 144, 144 (3d Dep’t 1988).
188. Metro. Transp. Auth., Metropolitan Transportation Authority Governance Principles

and By-Laws 6 (2010) (emphasis added), http://www.mta.info/mta/compliance/pdf/2010_annual/
GovernancePrinciplesandBy-Laws.pdf.
189. See Pub. Off. § 18.
190. See generally Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra

note 128.
191. This note does not prescribe a formula for distributing the fines collected.
192. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and

Proposed Reforms, 23 Iowa J. Corp. L., 631, 653 (1998).
193. See generally Reining in New York’s Secret Government, supra note 12.
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V. CONCLUSION

After the passage of the Reform Act, Assemblyman Richard Brodsky declared,
“Today, we return to the control of the people of the state their most powerful
institutions.”194 Governor Paterson echoed these sentiments: “[f]or too long, public
authorities have operated in the dark, under little or no public scrutiny. By signing
this bill into law today, we are turning those lights on.”195 While New York’s elected
officials have spoken about returning public authorities to the people and “turning
the lights on,” the Reform Act does little more than the Public Authority
Accountability Act to bring public authorities out of the dark. Reform efforts must
be more than bold proclamations and metaphors; they must work.
The fiduciary duty provisions of the Reform Act were incorporated to ensure
that the actions and decisions of public authority boards are in the public’s best
interest. While the amended law is an essential first step to achieving accountability,
as the Task Force recognized, active enforcement continues to be difficult to achieve.
Under the current law, the Authorities Budget Office lacks the power and the
resources to ensure that board members are complying with their duties of care and
loyalty. For positive change, the Authorities Budget Office must have adequate
enforcement capabilities.
The new fiduciary duty provisions are not only important in a political sense, but
also in a legal sense. The drafters of the Reform Act adopted the corporate model of
board governance, but improperly cut the essential remedial measures that are central
to achieving its purpose. The remedies available to shareholders of private and nonprofit corporations must carry over to public authority law. Without them, public
authority boards will continue to act in the dark without accountability. Real reform
requires a better system, and the imposition of fines on authority boards is just that.
A system of fines for board misconduct, coupled with a limited role for citizen
lawsuits and a better funded and staffed Authorities Budget Office, emerges as a
realistic and efficient model that will compensate the public and deter improper actions.
Such a system is cost effective and can be implemented quickly. But most importantly
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in the interest of the people they serve, and the active enforcement of the newly enacted
fiduciary duties is a crucial first step. It’s time to turn the lights on.

194. Confessore, supra note 105.
195. See Press Release, supra note 4.
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